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 “Conceptualising and Historicising the US Foreign Policy Establishment in a Racialised Class 
Structure”. Mark Ledwidge/Inderjeet Parmar 
Abstract: 
In recent years critical scholars of U.S. foreign policy have challenged the mainstream 
paradigm that fails to account for the racial dimensions of international relations. This 
article introduces a conceptual and historical analysis of the US foreign policy establishment 
that posits race and racism at its centre. While alluding to conventional theories of 
American power such as pluralism and statism, the article also highlights classical Marxism’s 
failure to acknowledge that US exceptionalism and racism conjoined in a manner that 
conferred a racial dimension to class politics. The article argues that the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment has been presided over by an elite or ruling elite; and irrespective of 
challenges from below, increasing diversity, or the insistence that America is a meritocratic 
classless society, the U.S establishment is at heart, elitist, racialised and generally Anglo-
centric. The article identifies links between the racial dimensions of U.S. foreign policy and 
the identity profile of the power elite. The paper extends and critiques C. Wright Mills’ 
definition of the power elite by mapping its racial dimension. Finally the article argues that 
although the election of Obama represented a more inclusive and cosmopolitan version of 
the establishment, Obama’s presence has helped to consolidate the status quo as the 
structural constraints on the executive branch and symbolism associated with the election 
of the first African-American president has generally silenced the Left and quietly fostered 
the suggestion that an unconventional identity profile will not necessarily result in the 
change we can believe in. 
Key words: racial identity; cosmopolitanism; foreign policy establishment; Anglo-centric; US 
power elite 
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One of the core concerns of this article and indeed this special issue on Elitism and American 
Power is to present new insights regarding the character of American power. While IR 
specialists provide coherent and competent accounts regarding the substance of America’s 
foreign policy, all too often the character and socio-politics of who actually constructs U.S. 
foreign policy is neglected (Ledwidge, 2013). This article entwines two important but 
currently marginal strands of foreign affairs scholarship. The article advances and builds on 
the contention of C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff that elitism represents a central 
pillar of the American polity, and argues that the substance of U.S. foreign policy is impacted 
by the existence of a racialised class system. As an aside it is important to mention that 
while ethnicity is mentioned in the article the core emphasise is race and racialization 
whereby racialization ‘refers to a social and political process of inscribing group affinity and 
difference primarily onto the body…as well as on others markers of lived experience’ 
(Vucetic, 211, 7). In short the article maintains that throughout American history the black 
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and white paradigm has served as the primary popular marker in regard to defining notions 
of superior and inferior (Plummer, 2013, 11) as opposed to ethnicity or even class.  
This article suggests without having the luxury to untangle them that race and ethnicity 
actually represent two distinct categories where race is associated with alleged hereditary 
traits while ethnicity is defined along the axis of culture (Winant et al, 1994,).    Thus we 
maintain that race has played the definitive role in determining “who governs” and who 
gets to formulate policy within the foreign affairs context. The first section of this article 
highlights the importance of power as defined in its various guises within the context of 
American politics. Secondly, the article examines both the strengths and deficiencies of 
American political culture. Thirdly, the article briefly discusses and critiques the mainstream 
and marginalised theories of American power. Finally, the article confirms the existence of 
an American elite class that has for the majority of American history been generally male 
and WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) but over time has been extended to include 
ethnic whites and white women and now presumably blacks into an ideological value laden 
political network.  
What is Power?  
In reality, power, and its exact characteristics is a complex and difficult concept to 
understand. In regards to American power the ideological foundations of the American 
creed presents problems for scholars of American political culture, as all too often scholars 
appear to accept at face value the rhetorical aspects of American exceptionalism. Here the 
Constitution the Bills of Rights and Liberal Democracy are credited as creating an 
evolutionary society where merit, individualism, equality and liberty represent the corner 
stones of American power (Lipset, 1996). One might say that the foremost power of the 
American Creed is its ability to propagate myths regarding the socio-political dynamics of 
American society. Given America’s emergence as an immigrant nation primarily populated 
by Europeans, America has constructed a mainstream American identity that is white. 
However American society has demonstrated the ability to respond to competitive 
realignments both from below and above yet still retain Euro-American hegemony 
(Ledwidge, 2011, Parmar et al, 2014). Disturbingly or not the construction of the premier 
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American identity and the legitimate parameters of American power were formulated by 
the Founding Fathers (Ledwidge et al, 6).     
Right from America’s inception the founders were concerned with power as early debates 
regarding the preferred parameters of the American republic involved debates regarding 
the founders’ factional preferences related to the articulation and the construction of the 
structural instruments of a federalist form of government that combined elements of both 
elite and popular democracy (Shubert et al, 2014; Milkis, et al, 2008; Nelson et al, 2010). 
Despite evidence to the contrary scholars and lay persons buy into the belief that the 
American political system’s structural features such as the Separation of powers, Federalism 
and the existence of some social and economic mobility demonstrates that America has a 
fluid social order where power is not concentrated within any institutional structures or 
social groupings.  
Identity as Power 
Although individualism is presented a core facet of U.S. society, an individual is also defined 
by their group identity. Consequently it is important that we acknowledge the importance of 
group identity in relation to the creation of the socio-political boundaries that determine 
policy outcomes and provide the basis for individual actors, groups and the institutions they 
inhabit to make decisions. According to David Mislan, ‘Social identity theory is a behavioural 
approach that places identity at its center…Identity is a powerful tool for understanding 
foreign policy decision making and international relations’ (Mislan, 2013, 17). While, it is 
true that US foreign policy specialists have addressed the subject of race and U.S. foreign 
policy one would be hard pressed to argue that race has assumed a central place within IR 
and or political science or foreign affairs literature. Indeed Vitalis claims that ‘white 
supremacy is not generally discussed either as a historical identity of the American state or 
an ideological commitment on which the “interdiscipline” of international relations is 
founded’ (Schmidt et al, 205, 106). While historians may have covered more ground in 
relation to race and foreign affairs given the age of the discipline in the U.S. and it’s scope 
the issue is still relatively marginal within the discipline of history. Suffice to say the realities 
of American identity politics are still marginal to mainstream literature pertaining to 
American power (Ledwidge, 2013). This failure contravenes the central narrative of the 
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Obama phenomenon, which underlines his racial or ethnic differentiation from the previous 
forty-three presidents as being a key transformative factor that was supposed to culminate 
in “Change that we could believe in” (Scott-Smith, 2012). 
The significance of identity and the group competition that is related to identity politics lies 
in their use in the construction of ideological categories that can produce hierarchical social 
groupings that allow for the construction of specific power relations. With that said we 
should expect to find tangible hierarchical and ideological structures in relation to American 
politics at home and abroad.  Additionally the historical and contemporary evidence shows 
that persons whose identity profile is noticeably different from the mainstream identity 
profile such as Obama would be subjected to increased scrutiny and suspicion due to their 
outsider status (Mazama, 2012; Vucetic, 2011). Thus the intensity of the questions in regard 
to Obama’s perceived and his actual competence (Singh, 2012) reflects the bias of U.S. 
society. Indeed even the emergence of the Tea party during Obama’s tenure raises 
questions regarding the unconscious and conscious bias associated with a president who 
some see as a threat to the status quo and Euro-Americans’ monopoly on political power 
(Parmar, et al, 2014). The fact that some Americans perceive the Obama presidency as an 
anomaly is hardly surprising as throughout American history the mainstream model for 
American identity has been exemplified by the racial, ethnic and elite, class identity of the 
Founding Fathers (Shubert, et al, 2014).  
Simply put, the Founding Fathers’ British identity provided a hegemonic lens through which 
a nativist and Anglo-centric identity profile was embedded into the socio-cultural 
foundations of mainstream American identity (Ledwidge, et al, 2014). To some it is not an 
accident that despite the increasing diversity within the hierarchical structure of U.S. 
society, America’s key institutions within government, business and the military have been 
and are overwhelmingly staffed by Americans whose ancestors came from Europe 
(Mazama, 2012). The historical evidence indicates that America’s power elite has had a 
Wasp profile (Parmar, 2012). Of course due to challenges from below from 1900 onwards 
the American elite class has had an increasing awareness of alternative projections of U.S. 
foreign policy and has over time become more diversified (Ledwidge, 2013). The debate 
revolves around how much credence one gives to individual and group agency versus the 
imposition of rigid ideological but at times seemingly fluid ideological and hierarchical social 
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filters that function as gatekeepers that determine who enters the corridors of power within 
America’s key institutions. Of course the immense soft power credentials of the American 
Dream and the American Creed suggest that irrespective of the failings of U.S. society with 
hard work one’s identity should not prevent one from replicating the type of social mobility 
that is exemplified by the rise of Obama (Scott-Smith, 2012). While the phenomenal success 
of Obama does not exemplify the options available to most African Americans, American 
society seems to provide forms of social mobility that is rarely comparable to European or 
other societies. Nonetheless not all-social groupings have been given equal access to ascend 
to the lofty heights of American society in regard to the accumulation of wealth and power 
(Domhoff, 2006; Mills, 2000). To summarise, one’s identity can confer both advantages and 
disadvantages in American’s quest for power and legitimacy. Suffice to say identity can 
assume a form of power, which confers status and which can aid in the accumulation of 
both political and economic power (Wilson, 1998).  
This article argues that race, class and ethnicity have and currently represent symbols of 
ideological and material power, which help determine who is considered as worthy to 
construct U.S. foreign policy. Another example of ideological power is the manner in which 
mainstream US foreign policy scholarship presents a sanitized view of American power 
(Krenn, 2006; Hunt, 1987; Vucetic, 2011; Plummer, 2013;McCarthy, 2009) whereby the 
liberal views associated with American internationalism assumes that America’s actions are 
generally benign.  Overall the racialised, ethno-centric class and gendered power relations 
of American power are obscured, neglected or overlooked by IR and political scientists to 
our detriment as it distorts understanding. Alternatively some academics may be less than 
willing to critically evaluate U.S. foreign policy due to a variety of factors related to their 
careers and their interactions with government officials or due to their pursuit of funding 
from powerful think tanks and foundations (Parmar, 2012). Hence scholars must 
acknowledge that the production of knowledge does not occur within a neutral context and 
neither do critiques of the commonly held views go unnoticed or occur without 
consequences. Academics are subject to numerous constraints derived from their inter 
personal contacts and social mores which can shape and constrain their perceptions of what 
is considered important or what ideas they are willing to propagate within the public arena. 
7 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the widespread claim that the U.S. is a popular democracy, Elitism 
does not figure prominently in IR or political science literature.  In brief in America the 
possession of a high socio-political or economic status is deemed to derive from the 
possession of superior traits evidenced from one’s education, wealth or character, all of 
which conform to the narrative that America is a meritocracy (Shubert et al, 2014). 
Unfortunately it would appear that most scholars of American politics, IR and American 
historians have not authored sufficient interdisciplinary texts that address the 
intersectionality that exists between racial power, Elite theory and the construction and 
execution of U.S. foreign policy. Therefore the elitist and racial tendencies that operate on 
an individual, group and institutional level; require further exploration regarding the staffing 
profiles of the U.S. government, corporations and the foreign policy establishment 
(Ledwidge, 2011).    
American Political Culture and Theories of American Power 
This section suggests that our theoretical toolbox pertaining to American power needs to be 
carefully reassessed. Theoretical analysis does not appear in a vacuum; theories are derived 
from specific cultural constructs and an attendant set of values and norms. Hence, 
academics and intellectuals are also subject to erecting their theories on the basis of said 
values and norms. In brief the foundational myths and related values have been propagated 
to the extent that it is difficult to disentangle fact from theory. It is also worth noting the 
tacit implication that America’s domestic values are also expressed within its foreign policy 
(Ledwidge, 2012; Hunt, 1987).  
While the substance of U.S. foreign policy is important the people who construct it reflect 
the power dynamics of American politics (Lang, 2012;Plummer, 1996). Thus it is imperative 
that the discussion concerning identity is not separated from our discourse on power in 
order to illuminate the connections between identity and power within the American polity. 
Whether we are discussing governments or mundane interactions between people at a 
rudimentary level, power relations help determine outcomes regarding who is given license 
to act and in relation to who gets what. Indeed Savigny and Marsden indicate in Doing 
Political Science and International Relations the importance of the concept of power in 
relation to Politics and IR (Savigny et al, 2011, 43).  Marsden and Savigny draw on the work 
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of Steven Lukes and his seminal work, Power: a Radical View, which questions Dahl’s 
conception of power (Savigny et al, 2011, 44).  
Dahl’s mainstream theory presents a base level model that assumes that the most 
influential group will be able to exercise their power by group ‘A having power over (group) 
B to the extent that A can get B to do something they would not otherwise do’ (Savigny et 
al, 2011, 44). Dahl’s thesis reinforces key facets of the American creed and upholds some of 
America’s core ideals such as fair play and the use of legitimate means to win power. Sadly a 
study of American history would present a less romanticised version of American power that 
would have to include the coercion and force that has characterised both historical and 
contemporary events in the USA (Yvette, 1971; Wilson, 1998;Jones et al, 2013). 
Conversely, the work of Bachrach and Baratz suggests that ‘personal or group power is 
manifest to the extent that a person or group  - consciously or unconsciously – creates or 
reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts’ (Savigny, 2011, 45). It is evident 
that U.S. foreign policy is relatively shielded from public scrutiny by drawing on the 
narratives of national security, expertise and patriotism in order to insulate foreign policy 
from the electorate who are assumed to lack the ability to understand foreign affairs. Aside 
from notions of expertise, one can argue that throughout U.S. history the architects of 
foreign affairs have demonstrated differential behaviour by prioritising the interests of 
Western or white nations in accordance with stated or unstated notions of race (Vucetic, 
2011; Plummer, 1996; Parmar et al, 2014). It is evident that in the case of African Americans’ 
efforts to point out the racial dynamics of U.S. foreign policy (between 1900 and 1968, at 
least), the U.S. government sought to neutralise and or modify their criticism regarding the 
racial dimensions of U.S. foreign policy (Ledwidge, 2012). It is apparent then that part of 
American power is the unique way in which the real and imagined libertarian aspects of 
American society are used to mask the structural and group inequalities that have been an 
enduring factor of America’s political history (Wilson, 1995). Still it is also true that America 
has promoted political reforms as a means of maintaining political stability and absorbing 
soft-core critics of the status quo like Obama into the ranks of the establishment.  
Theories of American Power 
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One could argue that theories such as pluralism and statism are prioritised over Marxism or 
elitism, while theories of race are virtually ignored in regard to foreign affairs analysis (Jones 
et al, 2006;Chowdhry et al, 2005;Long, et al, 2005). Given that pluralists maintain that 
power in the United States is diffuse and that any organised group has the potential to 
pursue or meet their interests; it has been argued that entry into the foreign policy 
establishment is based on merit, derived from expertise, intellect, and one’s educational 
background. Indeed pluralists would argue ‘that in the U.S. competitive groups are 
presented with broadly equal opportunities to vie for their interests…. In short, pluralists 
would contend that ‘racial and ethnic factors … [would] … play no role at all in the 
distributive process, either positive or negative…Pluralism would predict that one group 
would not dominate foreign policy’ (Ledwidge, 2012, 16). However pluralists’ depiction of 
American society does not acknowledge the lasting tradition of racial power in regard to the 
treatment of non-white nations and the historic racialized staffing profile of the foreign 
policy establishment. 
An alternative approach assumes that the American state apparatus is responsible for 
determining U.S. foreign policy.  Statists argue that the state’s strategic position in regard to 
the domestic and international arenas provides it with sufficient power to bend foreign and 
domestic issues to its own agenda. In brief ‘The special position of the state in foreign policy 
consists….in the formal and informal obligations that the President and State Department in 
particular, are charged with to further the ‘national interest.’ The President and State 
Department are highly insulated… ‘From specific societal pressures,’ and therefore…enjoy a 
high level of autonomy in establishing goals and promoting policies for their realisation’ 
(Parmar, 1995, 76). Statist Theory maintains the preferences of state actors are central to 
determining both outcomes and the character and by extension the substance of U.S. 
foreign policy. The fact that the offices of the presidency and the State Department do not 
have a tradition of racial diversification reflects the fact that Euro-American power elite has 
dominated the state apparatus (King, 1997).    
While America’s core interests are always a pertinent factor, one could argue that concepts 
such as the Anglosphere and Western racial supremacy were employed as ideological tools 
designed to limit and discourage military conflicts between white nations. It has been 
suggested that the termination of Native Americans, Slavery and the internment of 
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Japanese Americans in WWII and Truman’s use of two atomic bombs on Japan; and the 
scorched earth tactics employed during the Vietnam War illustrates how racism facilitates 
non-whites becoming the recipients of more aggressive action within the domestic and 
international context (Krenn, 2006; Hunt, 1987; McCarthy, 2009). It would be instructive to 
reflect on the ethno-cultural, religious and racial dynamics of the War on Terror. One could 
argue the Bush administration’s use and defence of torture and prolonged imprisonment at 
Guantanamo Bay and the massive loss of civilian lives in the respective populations as 
exemplifying a history of employing repressive military tactics against people of colour. 
Likewise the Obama administration’s proliferation of drone technology and his foreign 
policy in regard to the Muslim world is still interpreted by some authors of maintaining a 
less overt but evident cultural, civilizational and racial bias (Anievas, Manchanda, and 
Shilliam, 2015).   
It is clear that in general the foreign policy establishment has possessed an upper class 
accent and has had a geographical identity that incorporated rich or networked White males 
from the East coast (Mills, 2000). The construction of US foreign policy has generally been 
shielded from the mechanisms of popular democracy (Singh, 2003, 274; Dumbrell, 1990, 
53); which has ensured from the government’s perspective that the institutional 
mechanisms of the executive branch have kept US foreign policy under the tutelage of an 
educated elite. While it is good that some scholars acknowledge the existence of an East 
coast establishment we need to assess whether the identity profile of the establishment has 
helped to create sound and effective foreign policies. 
Elitism  
Elite theory is a significant but under-utilised model of American power that is advanced by 
Louis Schubert, Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler in the Irony of Democracy an Uncommon 
Introduction to American Politics. Schubert et al maintain that America is and has always 
been an elitist society (ibid, 2014, 1) but they argue that ‘elite theory is not a normative 
endorsement of elite rule, nor is it an automatic dismissal of it’ (ibid, 2014, 1). The Founding 
Fathers, who were elites themselves, constructed a society that was inherently elitist. Dye 
also briefly acknowledges the existence of class and racial lines in the founders’ new political 
experiment. Schubert et al indicate that the elite can be found at the head of key 
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institutions and perform the function of participating ‘in the decisions that allocate 
resources for society’…. The irony of Democracy…[also]… recognises that the American 
brand of elitism is fluid and provides for the ‘circulation of elites…[via the inclusion]…of 
talented and ambitious individuals from the lower strata into the elite’ (ibid, 2014, 50). The 
fluidity of the system also allows the elites to absorb new social groups and helps to 
contextualise the rise of Obama. While Dye et al present an accurate depiction of the elite 
class they don’t clearly indicate that elitism lends itself to creating major power inequalities 
that can result in the construction of ethnocentric and narrow foreign policies.  
The Power Elite  
For writers such as G. William Domhoff and C. Wright Mills, the insistence that American 
society is a meritocracy contravenes their own theories of American power.  
While the debate regarding the existence of a power elite is contentious, its premise is 
sound. However it is important that contemporary scholars reassess the established 
boundaries of the power elite. At base level Mills argued that ‘no one…can be truly powerful 
unless he has access to the command of major institutions’ (Mills, 2000, 9). Mills also 
indicated that entry into the power elite is determined via acceptance into the social circles 
of the elite and due to the possession of the required traits (Mills, 2000). Mills pointed out 
that the elite are of ‘similar social type [which facilitates]…their easy intermingling’. Given 
the historic and contemporary practices of drawing from a limited socio-political and 
ideological group to staff the foreign policy establishment, then the racial and ethnic 
composition of the establishment is bound to be limited. That is the politicians, corporate 
executives and military personnel that comprise and define the boundaries of the elite 
reflect the cultural, ethnic and racial biases of U.S. society. Hence it is imperative that we 
recognise that America’s power elite has also been organised along racial and ethnic lines. 
Taken from other another perspective, the power elite, while not completely homogeneous, 
has conceivably operated in regard to relatively narrowly defined ethno-centric group 
interests (Wilson, 1998). Domhoff is more explicit in outlining the group basis and potential 
group benefits bestowed on the power elite as he states; 
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‘the ability of a class to prevail begins in one of the four major networks – economic, 
political, military and religious- which can be turned into a strong organizational base for 
wielding power’(Domhoff, 2006, 12).  
Clearly the foreign policy establishment has defined its actions as protecting American 
interests; however its central position as a hub that straddles business interests both 
domestic and foreign, and the military industrial complex, inevitably provide major 
opportunities for its members to obtain wealth, power and prestige. Once viewed in-group 
terms any group or groups, which succeed in maintaining a hegemonic hold on the 
aforementioned institutions, would seek to or by default impede the entry of outsiders. 
Given that ‘Elites in the United States are drawn disproportionately from wealthy, 
educated…and socially prestigiously employed, and socially prominent elements of society’ 
(Schubert et al, 2014, 3) then Euro-Americans would be over-represented in the elite class 
and one would expect the existence of both racial and class bias in the foreign policy 
establishment. The evidence indicates that ‘historically…[American]… elites were 
overwhelmingly European American (or white), Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and male although 
it is clear today that the demographic diversity of the elite is changing significantly’ (ibid, 
2014, 3). Of course the level of real diversification within the establishment is not as 
significant, as Schubert and Dye maintain.  
The WASP Paradigm 
While the racial identity of members of the foreign policy establishment has been duly 
noted, historically America’s power elite have had a strong but at times seemingly 
unassuming ethnic component which Huntington calls the ‘Anglo-Protestant core’ 
(Huntington, 2004, 59) which has shaped its agenda and worldview alongside concerns over 
race. The significance of the WASP is highlighted by Srdjan Vucetic who identifies the 
cultural and linguistic dominance of the Anglo-sphere ‘centred first on London and then on 
Washington DC. The Anglo-sphere has dominated international politics of the world for the 
past 200 years…its agents – companies, empires, states, nations – colonised and 
industrialised large swathes of the planet and moved millions of its inhabitants often by 
force’ (Vucetic, 2011, 3). Rather than just being white, the establishment has favoured 
Britain and France over Germany and has executed a racial and ethnic worldview of foreign 
affairs (Vucetic, 2011). While demographic changes have given rise to other ethno-racial 
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groups’ ideas, WASP imperatives have generally been legitimised as representing the 
“national interest”(Parmar et al, 2009).  
While whiteness was/is important, being an ideological card carrying WASP has been an 
essential facet to ensure entry into the political class, while there is no evidence that the 
foreign policy establishment has actively sought to recruit African-Americans and non-
whites. Where non-whites have been granted entry into the establishment, their political 
views mirror the views of the established order (Ledwidge, 2014). Still it would be 
inaccurate to assume that WASPs have completely dominated both the construction and 
execution of U.S. foreign policy, as during the latter part of the 19th century a cosmopolitan 
ideal challenged Anglo-Saxon model dominance and led to the ascendancy of a more 
inclusive model of American power and legitimised the adoption of a multi-ethnic American 
identity.  
Suffice it to say discussions of the establishment do at times acknowledge the class or 
gender dynamics of the US establishment but Euro-American hegemony status is validated 
by U.S. history (Wellman, 1977; Hacker, 1992; Ledwidge, 2009). A white skin in addition to 
WASP attributes have legitimised Euro-American dominance over America’s key institutions 
(Cross, 1987; Ture, 1992). Hence racial identity has served as informal entry criteria 
regarding the identity profile of the individuals recruited into the foreign policy 
establishment. Given the racial biases of American society the racial composition of the 
foreign policy establishment has reflected the realities of America’s racial politics. Hence it is 
logical to characterise the foreign policy establishment, as being a racialized power elite 
whose relative influence is determined by events and historic currents.  Here the racialized 
state model of American power argues that despite the election of Obama, WASPs are still a 
predominant force in US politics and that a WASP elite has dominated U.S. society, in 
government and in the private sector in America; in addition the U.S. state has advanced 
racialized foreign policies. Thus America’s foreign policy should be assessed in regard to 
racial bias (Ledwidge, 2012, 18). This theory sees African Americans in particular as a 
racialized colony whereby the dominant Euro-American culture has consciously or 
unconsciously stifled their entry into the corridors of power, which includes the foreign 
policy establishment (Ledwidge et al, 2014, 5). Indeed, Wilson maintains that ‘white 
America strictly and stringently controls entry and naturalisation of outsiders within its 
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boundaries’ (Wilson, 1998, 142). Although the election of Obama seems to refute the idea 
of entrenched racial power within the U.S. government, from a liberal standpoint the 
incorporation of select non-whites provides numerous benefits in relation to U.S. soft 
power. At best the level of scrutiny of, and death threats aimed at, Obama and the acute 
criticisms of his foreign policy and his stalwart supporters indicate that his tenure as 
president speaks to partial acceptance and the rejection of an African American head of 
state. 
Marxism 
The Marxist Theory presents an economic account of history, which contends that socio-
political conflicts stem from class conflict. In general Marxists of all persuasions claim that 
the prime site of conflict is over the ‘ownership and control over the means of production 
and the distribution of the fruits of the productive process’ (Parmar, 1995, 11). Given that 
Marxist analysis supports a revolutionary struggle Marxism has understandably garnered an 
enduring tradition of suspicion amongst state actors. Another problem regarding Marxism is 
the failure to present its full compliment of ideas, such as Marx’s view that the ruling class 
utilises both ideas and culture to promote the production of a false reading of the concealed 
power dynamics of the alleged class war, and the maintenance of a false consciousness 
amongst the exploited classes. Here scholars must acknowledge that Marxist theory is not 
limited to the work of Marx only but is an expansive and adaptive theory of power.   
Marxism’s relevance is augmented by the fact that the economic exploitation of African-
Americans could be explained via a class as opposed to a racial analysis, as Marxism 
contends that the capitalist class controls the state. Given 'African-Americans' inferior 
economic or class status, Marxists would predict that their role in relation to foreign policy 
decisions would be minimal’ (Ledwidge, 2013, 18). Marxism’s contention that class not race 
is the central feature of African American oppression is controversial and contrary to most 
African American scholars organic analyses of American power.      
Marxist Class Analysis vs. Race  
The debate regarding the (either or) predominance of race versus class has some merit but 
often obscures the fact that both conceptualisations present important critiques of 
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American power that provide theorists’ with the means to decode the inequalities that exist 
in the USA. It is clear that the increased diversification of the power elite occurred as a 
consequence of the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s and the ideological 
requirements of the Cold War. Hence Jews, women and ethnic whites were incorporated 
into the foreign policy establishment. Still whilst the massive strides of African-Americans’ 
struggle to assert their human rights brought notable successes (politically, culturally, 
socially and economically), it has not succeed in creating a level playing field for African-
Americans (King et al, 2011). Still paradoxically William Julius Wilson (writing in 1978) 
pointed to The Declining Significance of Race.      
The Wilson Conundrum 
Wilson’s controversial thesis argued that ‘after World War II…. economic class gradually 
became more important than race in determining the individual life chances of African 
American’s’ (Wilson, 2012, 185). Despite outward appearances Wilson’s argument is 
nuanced as he argues in his preface that he does not ‘subscribe to the view that racial 
problems are necessarily derived from the more fundamental economic class problems’ 
(Wilson 2012, ix). One might surmise the apparent triumphs of the 1960s might have 
encouraged Wilson’s optimism. Still even today Wilson’s notion that in America ‘one’s 
economic class position determines in major measure one’s life chances’ (Wilson, 2012, ix) is 
not without merit. Nor could anyone deny that since the 1960s the African-American 
community has become more stratified in relation to class. Nonetheless the problem with 
the Marxists’ and Wilson’s contentions regarding the primacy of class is that Euro-Americans 
have been and still possess superordinate status as America’s elite class. Even after the post 
1960s legal reforms, the structural power of the white majority within and without 
government was able to negate or failed to facilitate the redistribution of wealth which has 
culminated in a sizable portion of the African-American population assuming the position of 
a racial underclass (Jones, 2013). Although class is a factor in relation to the contemporary 
status of African-Americans, the historical legacy of white privilege is central to the marginal 
status of blacks in the construction of U.S… [Politics and including U.S.] …foreign policy’ 
(Ledwidge, 2013, 174). From a rational perspective, African Americans’ exclusion from the 
power elite cannot in the American context be disentangled from the ideological and 
institutional power of American race relations. Ultimately, Marxism fails to acknowledge 
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that race is a primary determinant of blacks’ individual and group position in the socio-
politics of America and the western world’s power paradigm. While it is important that 
scholars acknowledge the recent improvements in the staffing of the establishment, the 
inclusion of small numbers of non-whites does not equate to the ending of white privilege 
as increased diversification can provide the appearance of equality whilst still maintaining 
the racial status quo.      
The Case for Improvements 
Although African-Americans have been active in foreign affairs since 1900, their entry into 
the foreign policy establishment has been limited, but has improved in regards to cabinet 
positions in recent years. For example Bill Clinton appointed nine African-Americans (in 8 
years), while G. W. Bush appointed Colin Powell as the first African American Secretary of 
State and Condi Rice as the first African American National Security Adviser, who also served 
as Secretary of State. Significantly President Bush appointed six African-Americans to top 
positions in his cabinet over eight years. However the first African American president has 
come under fire for failing to emulate his predecessors. 
As the chairwoman of the Congressional Black Caucus said, she is ‘concerned that President 
Obama has not yet appointed African-Americans to his second-term Cabinet’… Attorney 
General Eric Holder, appointed in Obama’s first term, remains the Obama administration’s 
only black Cabinet-level appointee. According to a recent Politics365 analysis, that’s the 
fewest by any president over the last 38 years’ 
(http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/287437-black-caucus-concerned-about-few-
blacks-in-cabinet#ixzz2PETBXD8o). Whilst the emergence of Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell 
and the election of Obama are indicative of African-Americans being incorporated into the 
establishment, the inclusion of African-Americans or other ethnic groups does not 
guarantee any real changes in U.S. foreign policy.  
For example the Obama presidency has not introduced any major departures from Bush’s 
foreign policy which lends credence to the Singh and Lynch thesis that prophesised limited 
changes after the Bush presidency (Singh et al, 2008); in addition there is no evidence that 
the ethnic and racial identities of Powell, Rice or Obama had any major impact on the 
alleged Clash of Civilisations associated with the war on terror. Although the rise of Obama 
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was coined as the new face of American power (Scott-Smith, 2012) that would facilitate the 
rebuilding of American Soft Power, it is hard to affirm such claims (Parmar et al, 2010). At 
this time neither Obama’s identity nor his opposition to the war on Iraq or his 
cosmopolitanism have produced any real departures from the political status quo.  
The Power Elite or Structural Impediments 
However the lack of change could be explained as a consequence of structural impediments. 
Also in regard to political appointments Obama’s choices signalled continuity not change as 
he picked Joseph Biden as his vice president and Hillary Clinton as his secretary of state, 
both part of the Washington and foreign affairs establishment. One can also argue that the 
absence of change is compounded by the separation of powers and structural impediments 
as while a president can institute changes within the executive branch there are numerous 
factors that can stifle their ability to promote real and substantial changes (Ledwidge, 2014, 
69). ‘This is important as it points to the agency versus structure debate which in this case 
suggests that the possibility for sea changes between the Bush and Obama administration 
where compounded by the Bush legacy’ (Ledwidge, 2014, 69). Simpler still Obama could 
have bought into the bi-partisan logic of the foreign affairs power elite, which despite party 
politics tends to execute foreign policy in a similar fashion.  
In summary, it has been argued in Obama and the World, that Obama has not distanced his 
administration from the mainstream foreign affairs establishment both in relation to race or 
ethnicity or ideology (Ledwidge, 2014, 69). On a personal level it is possible that Obama is 
open to status anxiety. Here the public questions concerning Obama’s racial and religious 
identity and his alleged allegiance to the causes of people of colour might have constrained 
any internal desires to promote real change within the domestic and the international 
context. Alternatively the astounding claims of Samuel Yette who wrote The Choice, might 
have some resonance in relation to Obama and the establishment’s appropriation of 
talented blacks as Yette argued that the American system had three core objectives when 
appointing black talent ‘(1) to provide colour credibility wherever such credibility was crucial 
to selling an otherwise invalid product; (2) to neutralise such talent by taking it from 
potentially radical stations…. and placing it officially on the side of the establishment’ (Yette, 
1971, 43).  
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To conclude, the character of the American polity does limit the ability of presidents to 
secure major changes. In addition Obama’s race may have made it harder to change U.S. 
foreign policy due to subtle and overt pressure to prove him-self worthy of the presidency. 
On the other hand it might be prudent to resist attributing Obama’s relative conservatism 
solely to race.         
Rather than assuming that Obama has sold out to the establishment it could be more 
instructive to argue that he has bought into the ideological assumptions and core practices 
of the foreign policy power elite. Note that Obama’s ambition and his pragmatism may have 
influenced him to uphold the practices of the power elite. That is despite the conjecture 
concerning demographic changes, the establishment has a deeply embedded ideological 
framework that still defines the political parameters of America’s national security 
framework. Therefore the change in the complexion of the president does not equate to 
cultural or political change as the ideological foundations of the power elite maintain their 
centrality as the organising principles of the establishment.  
Parmar sums it up quite well by stating quite bluntly that, ‘Obama’s administration could 
fairly be labelled a hybrid Bush-Clinton third term’ (Parmar, et al, 2014, 70). Given the 
structural and ideological power of the establishment and the national security power elite, 
the likelihood of any dramatic change in the latter part of the Obama’s presidency is 
unrealistic. While one gives credit to the power elite and the executive branch for 
incorporating new ethnic or racial groups into government circles it has not really altered its 
worldview or its ideological moorings. The core precepts of U.S. foreign policy appear to 
extend beyond any particular administration and are not subject to major changes whether 
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